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A rather easy yet rigorous proof of a version of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem is presented.
The version is “each recursively enumerable theory of natural numbers with 0, 1, +, ·, =, ∧, ¬, and ∀
either proves a false sentence or fails to prove a true sentence”. The proof proceeds by first showing
a similar result on theories of finite character strings, and then transporting it to natural numbers,
by using them to model strings and their concatenation. Proof systems are expressed via Turing
machines that halt if and only if their input string is a theorem. This approach makes it possible to
present all but one parts of the proof rather briefly with simple and straightforward constructions.
The details require some care, but do not require significant background knowledge. The missing
part is the widely known fact that Turing machines can perform complicated computational tasks.
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1 Introduction
Kurt Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem [2] is certainly one of the most important results in mathemat-
ical logic. Together with an improvement by Barkley Rosser [11], the theorem says that any recursive
sufficiently strong theory of natural numbers either proves a contradiction, or leaves both some sentence
and its negation without a proof. (We postpone discussion on Go¨del’s original formulation to Section 8,
because it uses a concept that cannot be explained briefly at this stage. “Recursive” and other background
concepts are informally introduced in Section 2.)
More recently, the theorem has often been presented in the form any recursively enumerable suffi-
ciently expressive theory of natural numbers either proves a sentence that does not hold or fails to prove
a sentence that does hold. This form is not equivalent to Go¨del’s and Rosser’s formulation. In some
sense it promises less and in some sense more. However, it is easier to prove and perhaps also easier to
understand. It makes the assumption of sufficient expressiveness (explained in Section 2) instead of the
stronger assumption of sufficient strength (explained in Section 8). This is the version discussed in the
major part of this paper. It is compared to Go¨del’s and Rosser’s formulation in Section 8.
Both Go¨del’s original proof and most of the modern expositions are long and technical. On the other
hand, its overall strategy can be explained rather briefly and is intuitively inspiring. As a consequence,
the proof is one of the most popularized ones. We only mention here the excellent book by Douglas R.
Hofstadter [3]. Unfortunately, to really grasp the result, the technicalities are necessary.
The goal of this paper is to present a rigorous proof which, excluding one detail, can be checked in full
by a reader with little background (but not necessarily with little effort). We hope that our proof makes
the result accessible to a wider audience than before. The skipped detail is the fact that some simple
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things can be computed by so-called Turing machines. Its rigorous proof would take many dull pages.
On the other hand, Turing machines have been very widely accepted as a universal theoretical model
of computation. Therefore, as long as it is obvious that something could be programmed in a modern
programming language, it is common practice to skip the proof that a Turing machine can compute it.
Our trick is to first prove that theories of finite character strings with string literals, concatenation, and
equality are incomplete. Then we derive the incompleteness of natural number arithmetic as a corollary.
In this way, the main constructions of the proof are made using finite character strings, while other
proofs make them using natural numbers. This makes our constructions much simpler and much more
understandable. The presentation of our proof in this paper is not remarkably short, but this is partly due
to the fact that it is very detailed.
Some background concepts are informally explained in Section 2. Our language on finite character
strings is defined in Section 3. Not every character can be represented by itself in a string literal. There-
fore, an encoding of characters is needed. Section 4 shows that the claim “string y is the sequence of
the encodings of the characters in string x” can be formulated in the language. Computations of Turing
machines are encoded in Section 5. The incompleteness of theories of strings is shown in Section 6, and
of theories of arithmetic in Section 7. Section 8 compares the version of the theorem in this paper to
Go¨del’s and Rosser’s versions. Discussion on related work and the conclusions are in Section 9.
An earlier, not peer-reviewed version of this paper appeared as arXiv:1402.7253v1.
2 Informal Background
A recursive theory consists of a language for formulating claims about some domain of discourse, to-
gether with a recursive proof system. In the case of Go¨del’s theorem, the domain of discourse is the
natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . together with addition (+), multiplication (variably denoted with ×, ·, *, or
nothing such as in 3x+1), and equality (=) with their familiar properties. A sentence is a claim without
input, formulated in the language. For instance, “3 is a prime number” lacks input but “p is a prime
number” has p as input. Of course, whether or not a claim can be formulated depends on the language.
When Go¨del published his theorem, the notion of “recursive proof system” had not yet developed into
its modern form. Indeed, instead of “recursive”, he used a word that is usually translated as “effective”.
Go¨del meant a mathematical reasoning system for proving sentences, where any proof could be checked
against a fixed set of straigthforward rules. Proofs were checked by humans, but the requirement was that
they could do that in a mechanical fashion, without appealing to intuition on the meaning of formulae.
This makes the proof system independent of the different insights that different people might have.
Today, “in a mechanical fashion” means, in essence, “with a computer that has at least as much
memory as needed”. It suffices that there is a computer program that inputs a finite character string and
eventually halts if it is a valid proof, and otherwise runs forever. If such a program exists, then there
also is a program that systematically starts the former program on finite character strings one by one in
increasing length and executes them in parallel until a proof for the given sentence is found. (We will see
in Section 7 how all finite character strings can be scanned systematically.) If the sentence has a proof,
the program eventually finds it and halts; otherwise it runs forever in a futile attempt to find a proof.
For mathematical analysis, computers and their programs are usually formalized as Turing machines.
We will introduce Turing machines in Section 5.
We will not need the assumption that a proof system resembles mathematical reasoning systems.
Indeed, we will not need any other assumption than machine-checkability. So we define a recursively
enumerable proof system as any Turing machine M that reads a finite character string and does or does
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not halt, such that if the string is not a sentence, then M does not halt. If the string is a sentence, it is
considered as proven if and only if M halts. A recursive proof system adds to this the requirement of the
existence of another Turing machine that halts precisely on those inputs, on which M does not halt.
Section 1 assumed that the language for expressing claims about natural numbers is sufficiently
expressive. It suffices that the language has constant symbols 0 and 1, an unbounded supply of variable
symbols, binary arithmetic operators + and ·, binary relation symbol =, binary logical operator ∧ (that
is, “and”), unary logical operator ¬ (that is, “not”), the so-called universal quantifier ∀, and parentheses
( and ). All symbols have their familiar syntactical rules and meanings. The universal quantifier is used
to formulate claims of the form ∀n : P(n) (that is, “for every natural number n, P(n) holds”).
For convenience, logical or ∨ can also be used without changing the expressiveness of the language,
because it can be built from ∧ and ¬, since P∨Q is logically equivalent to ¬(¬P∧¬Q). Also logical
implication →, existential quantifier ∃, inequality 6=, less than <, and all familiar numeric constants 2,
3, . . . , 9, 10, 11, . . . can be used, because P → Q is equivalent to ¬(P∧¬Q), ∃x : P(x) is equivalent to
¬∀x : ¬P(x), x 6= y is equivalent to ¬(x = y), x < y is equivalent to (∃z : x+ z+ 1 = y), and any such
numeric constant has the same value as some expression of the form (1+1+ . . .+1).
3 A First-Order Language on Finite Character Strings
In this section we define our language for expressing claims about finite character strings, that is, finite
sequences of characters. We use this font when writing in that language. To make it explicit where
a string in that language ends and ordinary text continues, we put white space on both sides of the string
even if normal writing rules of English would tell us not to do so. So we write “characters a , . . . , z
are” instead of “characters a, . . . , z are”.
The language uses the following characters:
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 " \ = /= ( ) ~ & | - > A E : + * <
We chose this set of characters for convenience. Any finite set containing at least two characters could
have been used, at the expense of a somewhat more complicated proof. This set facilitates the use
of familiar notation for many things. The fact that its size 53 is a prime number will be exploited in
Section 7. The characters a , . . . , z are lower case letters, and 0 , . . . , 9 are digits.
A finite character string or just string is any finite sequence of characters.
An encoded character is \0 , \1 , or any other character than " and \ . The encoded character
\0 denotes the character \ , \1 denotes " , and each remaining encoded character denotes itself. A
string literal is any sequence of characters of the form "α" , where α is any finite sequence of encoded
characters. It denotes the corresponding sequence of (unencoded) characters. For instance, "" denotes
the empty string and "backslash=\1\0\1" denotes the string backslash="\" . The purpose of
encoding is to facilitate the writing of " inside a string literal, without causing confusion with the "
that marks the end of the literal.
A variable is any string that starts with a lower case letter and then consists of zero or more digits.
For instance, a , x0 , and y365 are variables but 49 and cnt are not. The value of a variable is a
string. We say that the variable contains the string.
A term is any non-empty finite sequence of variables and/or string literals. It denotes the concate-
nation of the strings that the variables contain and/or string literals denote. For instance, "theorem" ,
"theo""rem" and "the""""o""rem" denote the same string theorem . If the variable x contains
the string or , then also "the"x"em" denotes theorem .
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An atomic proposition is any string of the form t=u or of the form t/=u , where t and u are terms.
The first one expresses the claim that the strings denoted by t and u are the same string, and the sec-
ond one expresses the opposite claim. So "theorem"="theo""rem" is a true atomic proposition, and
"theorem"/="theo""rem" is not. Indeed, t/=u expresses the same claim as ~t=u , where ~ is intro-
duced soon.
A formula is either an atomic proposition or any string of the following forms, where pi and ρ
are formulae and x is a variable: (pi) , ~pi , pi&ρ , pi|ρ , pi->ρ , Ax:pi , and Ex:pi . The
parentheses ( and ) are used like in everyday mathematics, to force the intended interpretation. In
the absence of parentheses, formulae are interpreted according to the following precedences: con-
catenation has the highest precedence, then = , ~ , & , | , -> , and : in this order. For instance,
~b=c|c="hello"&a=bc denotes the same as (~(b=c))|((c="hello")&(a=bc)) , and
Ax:~x="8"|x="8"->"u"="u" denotes the same as Ax:(((~(x="8"))|(x="8"))->("u"="u")) .
All operators associate to the left, so pi->ρ->σ means the same as (pi->ρ)->σ .
The formulae express the following claims:
(pi) expresses the same claim as pi ,
~pi expresses that pi does not hold,
pi&ρ expresses that pi and ρ hold,
pi|ρ expresses that pi holds or ρ holds or both hold,
pi->ρ expresses that if pi holds, then also ρ holds,
Ax:pi expresses that for any string x, pi holds, and
Ex:pi expresses that there is a string x such that pi holds.
To improve readability, we often add spaces into a formula, like Ax: x/="8" | x="8" . We may
also split a formula onto many lines.
A first-order language is any language whose formulae are built from atomic propositions like above.
The constants or literals, terms, and atomic propositions of a first-order language may be chosen as
appropriate to the domain of discourse. A variable of a first-order language may only contain a value in
the domain of discourse, while a variable of a higher-order language may be used more flexibly. When
talking about first-order languages in general, we use the symbols ¬, ∀, and so on, and when talking
about a particular first-order language specified in this paper, we use ~ , A , and so on.
We will need long formulae. To simplify reading them, we introduce abbreviations. The first abbre-
viation claims that variable a contains a character, that is, a string of length precisely one. The formula
consists of a="x" for each encoded character x, separated by | and surrounded by ( and ) . We do
not write it in full but instead write · · · to denote the missing part.
Char(a) :⇔ ( a="a" | a="b" | · · · | a="<" )
The abbreviation was written for variable a , but clearly a similar abbreviation can be written for any
variable. So we may use the abbreviations Char(b) , Char(g75) , and so on.
The next abbreviation claims that x is a substring of y . That is, there are strings u and v such
that string y is the same as string u followed by string x followed by string v .
Sb(x, y) :⇔ ( Eu:Ev: y=uxv )
When this abbreviation is used with u in the place of x , some other variable has to be used instead of
u on the right hand side. That is, Sb(u, y) does not abbreviate ( Eu:Ev: y=uuv ) but, for instance,
( Ez:Ev: y=zuv ) . The incorrect interpretation ( Eu:Ev: y=uuv ) contains a name clash, that
is, the variable x that is distinct from u in y=uxv in the definition of Sb(x, y) , became the same
variable as u . In general, when interpreting an abbreviation containing a subformula of the form Ax:pi
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or Ex:pi , it may be necessary to replace x by some other variable, to avoid name clashes. Further
information on this issue can be found in textbooks on logic, in passages that discuss “bound” and “free”
variables.
Please keep in mind that abbreviations are not part of our language. They are only a tool for com-
pactly referring to certain formulae that are too long to be written in full. Each string that uses abbre-
viations denotes the string that is obtained by replacing the abbreviations by their definitions, changing
variable names in the definitions as necessary to avoid name clashes.
4 A Formula Expressing the Encoding of Characters
In this section we show that a formula Q(x, y) can be written that claims that y is the encoding of x ,
that is, y is obtained by replacing \0 for each \ and \1 for each " in x . We start with a formula
claiming that y is obtained by replacing v for one instance of u inside x .
RepOne(x, u, v, y) :⇔ ( Ee:Ef: x=euf & y=evf )
The next formula claims that, under certain assumptions mentioned below, y is obtained by replac-
ing v for every instance of u inside x . It converts x to y by making the replacements one by one.
It assumes that v has no characters in common with u , so that no fake instances of u can occur in-
side or overlapping v . Furthermore, it assumes that different instances of u in x do not overlap, so
that the result is independent of the order in which the instances are chosen for replacement. It also as-
sumes that p (for punctuation) is a string that does not occur inside x , y , or any intermediate result.
Furthermore, p cannot overlap with itself. We will later see how p is constructed.
The sequence of replacements is represented by s as a sequence of the form px1px2p· · ·pxnp ,
where x1 = x , xn = y , and x2, . . . , xn−1 are the intermediate results. The requirements on p guar-
antee that s can be decomposed into this form in precisely one way. The parts (Et: s=pxpt) and
(Et: s=tpyp) guarantee that x1 = x and xn = y . Thanks to ~Sb(u, y) , every instance of u is re-
placed. The rest of the formula picks each xi other than the last and claims that xi+1 is obtained from it
by making one replacement. The xi is represented by h and xi+1 by k . They are distinguished by not
containing p , being preceded by p , being separated from each other by p , and being succeeded by
p .
RepAll(x, u, v, y, p) :⇔ ( Es:
(Et: s=pxpt) & (Et: s=tpyp) & ~Sb(u, y)
& Ah:Ak: ( Sb(phpkp, s) & ~Sb(p, h) & ~Sb(p, k) ) -> RepOne(h, u, v, k)
)
To emphasize that abbreviations are not but stand for strings in our language, and that the strings
they stand for are often not easy to comprehend, we now show the string that RepAll(x, u, v, y, p)
stands for. The real string is too long to be shown on one line, so we split it on two lines.
(Es:(Et:s=pxpt)&(Et:s=tpyp)&~(Ez:Ev:y=zuv)&Ah:Ak:((Eu:Ev:s=uphpkpv)&
~(Eu:Ev:h=upv)&~(Eu:Ev:k=upv))->(Ee:Ef:h=euf&k=evf))
To obtain the punctuation string p , we first make variable q contain some sequence of :-characters
that does not occur inside x . Such a string exists, because the string consisting of n+ 1 :-characters
meets the requirements, when n is the length of x .
Punct(x, q) :⇔ ( ( Aa: Sb(a, q) & Char(a) -> a=":" ) & ~Sb(q, x) )
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The p used above is obtained as "+"q , that is, by adding a +-character to the front of the sequence
of :-characters in variable q . So the value of p is +::::: or some similar sequence with a different
number of :-characters. It clearly neither overlaps with itself nor occurs within x .
To guarantee that u and v do not have characters in common, we first convert each instance of
\ to "*"q , that is, to some string of the form *:::· · ·: that does not occur inside x . Then each
*:::· · ·: is converted to \0 , then each " to *:::· · ·: , and finally each *:::· · ·: to \1 . In the
first conversion, u consists of a single character, so different instances of u do not overlap. The same
holds for the third conversion. In the second and fourth conversion, u is *:::· · ·: , which clearly
cannot overlap with itself. Furthermore, +:::· · ·: does not overlap and is not inside *:::· · ·: , so p
cannot occur in y or any intermediate result.
We are now ready to write Q(x, y) . In it, the value \ is represented by the string literal "\0" ,
\1 by "\01" , and so on.
Q(x, y) :⇔ ( Eq: Punct(x, q)
& Ex1: RepAll( x, "\0", "*"q, x1, "+"q)
& Ex2: RepAll(x1, "*"q, "\00", x2, "+"q)
& Ex3: RepAll(x2, "\1", "*"q, x3, "+"q)
& RepAll(x3, "*"q, "\01", y, "+"q) )
5 Encoding Turing Machine Computations
Turing machines are a formal model of computation. In this section we show that for each Turing
machine, there is a formula Pvble(x) that yields true if and only if the machine eventually halts, given
x as the input. We call it Pvble(x) , because the Turing machine is thought to represent some proof
system such that it halts if and only if x can be proven.
Details of the definition of Turing machines vary in the literature. To start our definition, we in-
troduce a new symbol ⊔, called blank. Let b-strings be defined similarly to strings, but they may also
contain blanks. So our Turing machines use 54 symbols: 53 characters and the blank. A Turing machine
consists of a control unit, a read/write head, and a tape that consists of an infinite number of cells in both
directions. Each cell on the tape may contain any character or ⊔. When we say that some part of the tape
is blank, we mean that each cell in it contains ⊔. At any instant of time, the read/write head is on some
cell of the tape. During a computation step, the read/write head rewrites the content of the cell and then
possibly moves to the previous or the next cell, as dictated by the control unit and the contents of the cell
before the step.
The control unit consists of states and rules. The states are numbered from 0 to r, for some positive
integer r. State 0 is called the final state. There are 54r rules, one for each state q other than 0 and for
each character c and ⊔. A rule is of the form (c,q) 7→ (c′,q′,d), where c′ is any character or ⊔, q′ is
any state, and d is either L , R , or N . The meaning of the rule is that if the control unit is in state q
and the tape cell under the read/write head contains c, then the machine writes c′ on the cell, moves the
read/write head one cell to the left or right or does not move it, and the control unit enters its state q′. If
the control unit enters state 0, then computation halts.
Initially, the tape contains a finite sequence of characters, written somewhere on the tape. This finite
sequence is the input to the machine. The rest of the tape is initially blank. Initially, the read/write head
is on the first input character (or just anywhere, if the input is empty), and the control unit is in state 1.
At any instant of time, let the right b-string mean the content of the cell under the read/write head,
the content of the next cell to the right, and so on, up to and including the last character on the tape. If
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the cell under the read/write head and all cells to the right are blank, then the right b-string is empty. So
the last symbol of a non-empty right b-string is always different from ⊔. Let the left b-string be defined
similarly, but starting at the cell immediately to the left of the read/write head, and proceeding to the left
until the first character on the tape is taken. Again, the left b-string may be empty, and if it is not, then
its last symbol is not ⊔. The contents of the tape as a whole are an infinite sequence of blanks extending
to the left, then the left b-string reversed, then the right b-string, and then an infinite sequence of blanks
extending to the right. Initially, the left b-string is empty and the right b-string contains the input.
A halting computation corresponds to a sequence (λ0,q0,ρ0), (λ1,q1,ρ1), . . . , (λn,qn,ρn), where λ0
is the empty string, q0 = 1, ρ0 is the input string, qn = 0, qi 6= 0 when 0 ≤ i < n, and each (λi,qi,ρi)
for 1≤ i≤ n is obtained from (λi−1,qi−1,ρi−1) as follows. Here λi is the left b-string and ρi is the right
b-string after i computation steps. Let c = ⊔ if ρi−1 is empty, and otherwise let c be the first symbol of
ρi−1. There is a unique rule of the form (c,qi−1) 7→ (c′,q′,d). We have qi = q′. The b-strings λi and
ρi are obtained by replacing c′ for the first symbol of ρi−1, with special treatment of the case that ρi−1
is empty or c′ = ⊔; and then possibly moving the first symbol of the resulting b-string to the front of
λi−1, or moving a symbol in the opposite direction, again with some special cases. The special cases are
discussed in more detail later in this section. The moving of a symbol from the right b-string to the left
b-string models the movement of the read/write head one cell to the right, and the moving of a symbol in
the opposite direction models the movement of the read/write head one cell to the left.
We want to model this sequence in our language on strings. The states qi are represented simply by
writing their numbers using the digits 0 , 1 , . . . , 9 in the usual way. That is, state number 32768 is
represented by 32768 . The b-strings λi and ρi are more difficult, because they may contain blanks,
but there is no blank character in our language. So we represent ⊔ with \2 and \ with \0 . To
simplify later constructions by remaining systematic with the encoding in Section 3, we also represent
" with \1 . All other characters represent themselves. To summarize, \ , " , and ⊔ on the tape of
the Turing machine are represented in λi and ρi by the values \0 , \1 , and \2 , whose string literal
representations are "\00" , "\01" , and "\02" . In this sense, \ and " become doubly encoded.
So we define an encoded symbol as \0 , \1 , \2 , or any other character than \ and " . We
need not (and could not) say that ⊔ is not an encoded symbol, because ⊔ is not a character at all.
EChar(e) :⇔
( e="\00" | e="\01" | e="\02" | Char(e) & e/="\0" & e/="\1" )
The next formula expresses that y is obtained from x by replacing e for its first encoded symbol,
with special treatment of the empty strings and the blank. If x consists of at most one encoded symbol,
x as a whole is overwritten. The result is the empty string if e is the encoded blank, and otherwise the
result is e . If x consists of more than one encoded symbols, ordinary replacement occurs.
Write(x, e, y) :⇔ (
( x="" | EChar(x) ) & ( e="\02" & y="" | e/="\02" & y=e )
| ( Ef:Ez: x=fz & EChar(f) & z/="" & y=ez )
)
Let the encoded form of the left b-string be called left string, and similarly with the right b-string.
The next formula expresses the removal of the first encoded symbol from one string and its addition to the
front of another string, again with special treatment of the empty strings and the blank. The variables f1
and f2 contain the values of the from-string before and after the operation, and t1 and t2 contain
the to-string. The encoded blank \2 is never added to the front of an empty to-string, to maintain the
rule that the b-strings never end with the blank. If the from-string is empty, then the operation behaves
as if the encoded blank were extracted from it.
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Move(f1, t1, f2, t2) :⇔ (
( f1="" & t1="" & f2="" & t2="" )
| ( f1="" & t1/="" & f2="" & t2="\02"t1 )
| ( f1="\02"f2 & t1="" & t2="" )
| ( Ee: EChar(e) & f1=ef2 & (e/="\02" | t1/="") & t2=et1 )
)
Next we introduce a formula for each rule (c,q) 7→ (c′,q′,d). Let c˙ = \0 , if c = \ ; c˙ = \1 , if c = " ;
c˙ = \2 , if c = ⊔ ; and otherwise c˙ = c. Let c¨ = \00 , if c = \ ; c¨ = \01 , if c = " ; c¨ = \02 , if c = ⊔ ;
and otherwise c¨ = c. We define c˙′ and c¨′ similarly. Let q˙ denote q written using 0 , 1 , . . . , 9 in the
usual way, and similarly with q˙′.
We consider first the case where d = N. The first part of the formula checks that the rule triggers, that
is, the current state is q and the symbol under the read/write head is c, taking into accout the possibility
that the right string is empty. The second part of the formula gives the state of the control unit, the right
string, and the left string new values as dictated by the rule.
Rulec
′
,q′,N
c,q (l1, r1, q1, l2, r2, q2) :⇔ (
q1="q˙" & ( r1="" & "c¨"="\02" | Ex: r1="c¨"x )
& q2="q˙′" & Write(r1, "c¨′", r2) & l2=l1
)
Rules with d = R or d = L are similar, but the moving of the read/write head is also represented.
Rule
c′,q′,R
c,q (l1, r1, q1, l2, r2, q2) :⇔ (
q1="q˙" & ( r1="" & "c¨"="\02" | Ex: r1="c¨"x )
& q2="q˙′" & Er: Write(r1, "c¨′", r) & Move(r, l1, r2, l2)
)
Rulec
′
,q′,L
c,q (l1, r1, q1, l2, r2, q2) :⇔ (
q1="q˙" & ( r1="" & "c¨"="\02" | Ex: r1="c¨"x )
& q2="q˙′" & Er: Write(r1, "c¨′", r) & Move(l1, r, l2, r2)
)
Let ¨λi and ρ¨i be obtained from λi and ρi by replacing each symbol c in them with c¨. The computation
of the Turing machine is represented as a string c of the form
" ¨λ0"ρ¨0\3q˙0" ¨λ1"ρ¨1\3q˙1"· · ·" ¨λn"ρ¨n\3q˙n" .
Because the q˙i consist of just digits and the ¨λi and ρ¨i have been encoded, " and \3 cannot occur inside
them. So they can be used for separating the ¨λi, ρ¨i, and q˙i from each other.
We are ready to write the formula that claims that the Turing machine halts on input x . It says
that there is a sequence c that models the computation. First, c starts with the empty left string, the
encoded input string as the right string, and 1 as the state. Second, c ends with 0 as the state. Finally,
each " ¨λi"ρ¨i\3q˙i" ¨λi+1"ρ¨i+1\3q˙i+1" satisfies some rule. That q1 and q2 do not pick more from c
than they should follows from the fact that the rules check that they consist of digits only.
Pvble(x) :⇔ ( Ec:
( Et:Ey: Q(x, y) & c="\1\1"y"\031\1"t ) & ( Et: c=t"\030\1" )
& ( Al1:Ar1:Aq1: Al2:Ar2:Aq2:
~Sb("\1", l1) & ~Sb("\1", r1) & ~Sb("\1", l2) & ~Sb("\1", r2)
& Sb("\1"l1"\1"r1"\03"q1"\1"l2"\1"r2"\03"q2"\1", c)
-> ( Rule1 (l1, r1, q1, l2, r2, q2)
| · · · | Rule54r (l1, r1, q1, l2, r2, q2) ) )
)
Antti Valmari 363
6 Incompleteness of Theories of Finite Character Strings
In this section we prove that any recursively enumerable proof system for our language on strings either
fails to prove some true sentence, or proves some false sentence.
Please remember that Q(x, y) and Pvble(x"\1"y"\1") are abbreviations used in this paper to
improve readability, and not as such strings in our language. They stand for some strings in our language
that are too long to be written explicitly in this paper. Each of these two long strings has a corresponding
encoded string, which is obtained by replacing \0 for each \ and \1 for each " . We denote them
with Q˙(x, y) and P˙vble(x"\1"y"\1") . Also remember that Q(x, y) claims that y is the encoded
form of x . Therefore,
Q( Q(x, y), Q˙(x, y) ) and Q( Pvble(x"\1"y"\1"), P˙vble(x"\1"y"\1") ) hold.
We can now write Go¨del’s famous self-referential sentence in our framework as follows.
Ex:Ey: Q(x, y) & ~Pvble(x"\1"y"\1") & x=
"Ex:Ey: Q˙(x, y) & ~P˙vble(x"\1"y"\1") & x="
Let α be any string and β be its encoded form. Then x="β" says that the variable x has the value α .
Therefore, the last part of Go¨del’s sentence says that the value of x is the following string, with Q(x, y)
and Pvble(x"\1"y"\1") replaced by the strings they stand for:
Ex:Ey: Q(x, y) & ~Pvble(x"\1"y"\1") & x=
This and Q(x, y) together say that the value of y is the following string, with Q˙(x, y) and
P˙vble(x"\1"y"\1") replaced by the strings they stand for:
Ex:Ey: Q˙(x, y) & ~P˙vble(x"\1"y"\1") & x=
The string literal "\1" denotes the string " . Thus the value of x"\1"y"\1" is the value of
x followed by " followed by the value of y followed by " . Remembering that spaces and divi-
sion to lines are only for simplifying reading and not part of the real string, we see that the value
of x"\1"y"\1" is Go¨del’s sentence. Furthermore, ~Pvble(x"\1"y"\1") claims that x"\1"y"\1"
is not provable. To summarize, the other parts of Go¨del’s sentence make x"\1"y"\1" be Go¨del’s sen-
tence, and ~Pvble(x"\1"y"\1") says that it is not provable. Altogether, Go¨del’s sentence claims that
Go¨del’s sentence is not provable.
The formula Pvble() specifies a proof system for strings. Go¨del’s sentence is not a single sentence,
instead, each proof system for strings has its own Pvble() and thus its own Go¨del’s sentence. Go¨del’s
sentence of a proof system for strings claims that Go¨del’s sentence of that system is not provable in that
system.
The Turing machine that halts immediately independently of the input represents a proof system for
strings that proves every sentence. This proof system is useless, because for any sentence that it proves,
it also proves its negation. So it proves many false sentences. However, it serves as an example of a proof
system that proves its own Go¨del’s sentence.
Consider now any proof system for strings that proves its own Go¨del’s sentence. Because the sen-
tence claims that the system does not prove it, the system has proven a false sentence. Consider then any
proof system for strings that does not prove its own Go¨del’s sentence. Its Go¨del’s sentence thus expresses
a true claim, and is thus a true sentence that the system does not prove.
We have proven the following.
Theorem 1 Each recursively enumerable proof system for the first-order language on finite character
strings with string literals, concatenation, and =, either proves a false sentence or fails to prove a true
sentence.
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That is, there is no recursively enumerable proof system for strings that proves precisely the true sen-
tences and nothing else. No recursively enumerable proof system for strings can precisely capture the
true claims on strings that can be expressed in our language. This is the incompleteness theorem for
strings.
7 Incompleteness of Natural Number Arithmetic
In this section we show that natural number arithmetic can simulate strings and their concatenation, and
conclude that also natural number arithmetic is incomplete.
Our language on natural number arithmetic uses the same characters as our language on strings in
Section 3. A number literal is either 0 or any non-empty finite sequence of digits that does not start with
0 . A variable is any string that starts with a lower case letter and then consists of zero or more digits.
The value of a variable is a natural number. A term is a variable, a number literal, or any of the following,
where t and u are terms: (t) , t+u , or t*u . The parentheses are used in the familiar way, + denotes
addition, and * denotes multiplication. Furthermore, * has higher precedence than + , that is, t+u*v
denotes the same as t+(u*v) . Atomic propositions and formulae are defined like in Section 3.
We now introduce a one-to-one correspondence between strings and natural numbers. Let p = 53,
and let the 53 characters in the character set be given numbers from 1 to 53. If c′i is a character, then let
its number be denoted with ci. The string c′1c′2 · · ·c′n has the number
num(c′1c
′
2 · · ·c
′
n) = c1 p
n−1 + c2 pn−2 + . . .+ cn−2 p2 + cn−1 p+ cn .
So the empty string has the number 0, and the number of any string consisting of precisely one character
is the number of that character. Let ιn denote the string of length n whose every character has number 1.
We have num(ιn) = pn−1 + . . .+ p+1, and ι0 is the empty string.
We have to show that this mapping is indeed one-to-one. To do that, for each string c′1c′2 · · ·c′n we
introduce a successor and prove that the number of the successor is always one bigger than the number
of the string itself. If ci = p for every 1≤ i≤ n, then the successor is defined as ιn+1. We have
num(ιn+1)
− num(c′1c
′
2 · · ·c
′
n)
=
pn + pn−1 + . . . + p + 1
− ppn−1 − ppn−2 − . . . − p ·1 = 1 .
In the opposite case, at least one of c1, . . . , cn is not p. Let j be the last such index, that is, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
c j 6= p, and ci = p when j < i≤ n. The successor is defined as the string d′1d′2 · · ·d′n, where di = ci when
1≤ i < j, d j = c j +1, and di = 1 when j < i≤ n. We have
num(d′1d′2 · · ·d′n)−num(c′1c′2 · · ·c′n) =
c1 pn−1 + . . . + c j−1 pn− j+1 + (c j +1)pn− j + pn− j−1 + . . . + p + 1
− c1 pn−1 − . . . − c j−1 pn− j+1 − c j pn− j − ppn− j−1 − ppn− j−2 − . . . − p ·1
= 1 .
We see that the empty string, its successor, the successor of that string, and so on are in one-to-one
correspondence with the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, and so on. It remains to be proven that this sequence
of strings covers all strings. It does not contain any string twice, because the corresponding natural
numbers are all distinct. So it contains infinitely many distinct strings. For any n, there is only a finite
number of strings of length n. So the sequence cannot get stuck at any length n. The only case where the
successor is of different length than the string itself is when the successor is ιn+1. So the sequence covers
at least ι0, ι1, ι2, and so on. Between ιn and ιn+1, including ιn but not ιn+1, the sequence goes through
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num(ιn+1)−num(ιn) = pn strings of length n. The number of strings of length n is pn, so the sequence
goes through all of them.
We have shown that our correspondence between strings and natural numbers is one-to-one.
Our next task is to represent concatenation of strings as a formula on their numbers. The definition
of num yields immediately
num(c′1 · · ·c
′
nd′1 · · ·d′m) = pmnum(c′1 · · ·c′n)+num(d′1 · · ·d′m) .
To present this in our language, we have to extract pm from num(d′1 · · ·d′m) only using the language.
Let y = num(d′1 · · ·d′m). We have num(ιm) ≤ y < num(ιm+1), that is, pm−1 + . . .+ 1 ≤ y < pm + . . .+ 1.
Multiplying this by p−1 we get pm−1 ≤ y(p−1) < pm+1−1, to which adding y+1 yields pm + y ≤
yp+1 < pm+1+y. If m′> m, then pm′+y≤ yp+1 does not hold, and if m′< m, then yp+1 < pm′+1+y
does not hold. Therefore, k = pm if and only if k is a power of p and k+ y≤ yp+1 < pk+ y.
A prime number is a natural number greater than 1 that cannot be represented as a product of two
natural numbers greater than 1. If p is a prime number and pm = xy, then, for some 0 ≤ i ≤ m, x = pi
and y = pm−i. Therefore, and because 53 is a prime number, the property that k is a power of 53 can be
formulated as follows.
Pow53(k) :⇔ ( Ax:Ay: k=x*y -> x=1 | Ez: x=53*z )
That x < y can be expressed as follows.
lt(x, y) :⇔ ( Ei: y=x+i+1 )
Based on these considerations, if x and y are the numbers of two strings, then the number of the
concatenation of the strings is obtained as follows.
Cat(x, y, z) :⇔
( Ek: Pow53(k) & lt(y*53+1, 53*k+y) & ~lt(y*53+1, k+y) & z=k*x+y )
Atomic propositions in our language on strings are of the form t1 · · · tm=u1 · · ·un or t1 · · · tm/=u1 · · ·un ,
where t1, . . . , tm, u1, . . . , un are variables or string literals. They can be replaced as shown below for = ,
where t and u are two variable names that are different from the ti and u j.
( Et:Eu: t=u
& ( Eu: Cat(u, tm, t) & Et: Cat(t, tm−1, u) & Eu: Cat(u, tm−2, t) & . . . )
& ( Et: Cat(t, un, u) & Eu: Cat(u, un−1, t) & Et: Cat(t, un−2, u) & . . . )
)
There is a Turing machine T1 that inputs a sentence in the language on strings, replaces each string
literal by its number, and replaces each atomic proposition as shown above. (We could have made this
easier for the Turing machine but harder for the reader by, in Section 3, not allowing more than one
character in any string literal, not allowing more than one variable and/or string literal in a term, and
instead declaring that <x+y:z> expresses that xy=z.) If there is a Turing machine T2 that halts on the
true sentences in the language on natural numbers and fails to halt on false sentences, then there is a
Turing machine T that first runs T1 and then runs T2 on the result. By construction, T halts if and only
if its input string is a true sentence in the language on strings. But we proved in Section 6 that such a
Turing machine does not exist. Therefore, T2 does not exist. We have proven the following.
Theorem 2 Each recursively enumerable proof system for the first-order language on natural numbers
with 0, 1, +, ·, and =, either proves a false sentence or fails to prove a true sentence.
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8 Versions of Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem
We proved that any recursively enumerable theory of natural numbers with zero, one, addition, multipli-
cation, equality, logical and, logical not, and the universal quantifier either proves a false sentence or fails
to prove a true sentence. Although this theorem is widely called Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem,
it falls short of what Go¨del presented in [2]. It assumes that the truth or falsehood of a sentence can be
reasonably talked about, even if the theory does not prove either. (When we say that a theory proves a
sentence false, we mean that the theory proves the negation of the sentence.) This assumption has been
criticized. Perhaps for this reason, Go¨del went beyond this version. To discuss this, we first make the
following observation.
In the presence of truth and falsehood as we usually consider them, a sentence and its negation cannot
both be true. Furthermore, for each sentence, either it or its negation is true. A theory is consistent if and
only if in no case it proves both a sentence and its negation. A theory is complete if and only if in each
case it proves the sentence or its negation. (The word “complete” is used in more than one meaning in
mathematical logic. This is the meaning we use here.) Therefore, if a theory proves only true sentences
and proves all of them, then it is consistent and complete.
The notions of consistency and completeness do not rely on a pre-defined notion of truth of a sen-
tence. However, they do not together mean the same as “proves only true sentences and proves all of
them”, because it may be that the theory fails to prove a true sentence and instead proves its false nega-
tion. Indeed, there are consistent and complete theories whose language is the same as the language of
natural number arithmetic. An example is obtained by letting 0 denote false, 1 denote true, + denote
∨, and · denote ∧, and by adopting the usual axioms and inference rules of = and propositional logic
together with two special rules: “∀x : P(x) is equivalent to P(0) ·P(1)” and “∃x : P(x) is equivalent to
P(0)+P(1)”. This theory could well be called a first-order theory of truth values. It proves sentences
that are false from the point of view of natural number arithmetic, such as 1+ 1 = 1 (which represents
true∨ true = true). It is a consistent and complete theory, but a wrong theory for natural number arith-
metic although it has the same language.
Another way to look at this is that the replacement of the notions of truth and falsehood by com-
pleteness and consistency disconnect the language from natural numbers, leaving only two uninterpreted
constant symbols 0 and 1, and two uninterpreted binary operator symbols + and ·. The mere fact that the
symbols look familiar does not give them any formal properties. Instead, to make them again have a link
with natural number arithmetic, some axioms and inference rules are needed.
In conclusion, the right liberation of the incompleteness result from the notion of pre-defined truth
is that no “sufficiently strong” theory of natural number arithmetic is consistent and complete. Here
“sufficient strength” has two aspects. First, the notion of first-order theories has a standard set of logical
axioms and inference rules. It is assumed. Second, enough properties of natural numbers are assumed
in the form of axioms, to ensure that the theory indeed is a theory of natural numbers instead of, say,
the theory of truth values sketched above. Not much is needed. A rather weak axiom system known as
Robinson arithmetic suffices [10, 12]. It is otherwise the same as the well-known Peano arithmetic, but
the induction axiom has been replaced by the axiom “each natural number is either 0 or the result of
adding 1 to some natural number.”
Go¨del did not prove the theorem in the form stated above. Instead of consistency, he used the stronger
notion called ω-consistency. A theory is not ω-consistent if and only if it is not consistent or, for some
formula P with one free variable x, it proves both ∃x : P(x) and each one of ¬P(0), ¬P(1), ¬P(2), . . . .
That a theory proves each one of ¬P(0), ¬P(1), ¬P(2), . . . does not necessarily imply that it proves
their conjunction ∀x : ¬P(x), because no proof can go through an infinite number of cases one by one
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(proofs must be finite), and a common pattern that would facilitate proving them simultaneously in a
single proof does not necessarily exist. Even so, intuition says that if none of P(0), P(1), P(2), and so
on holds, then there is no x such that P(x) holds, that is, ¬∃x : P(x) holds. So a healthy theory of natural
number arithmetic must be not only consistent, but also ω-consistent.
Go¨del’s result was that such a theory cannot be complete. Let Prf(x,y) denote the claim that natural
number x is the encoding of a proof of the sentence encoded by natural number y. This claim can be
formulated in natural number arithmetic. Furthermore, if Prf(x,y) holds, then Prf(x,y) can be proven,
and if ¬Prf(x,y) holds, then ¬Prf(x,y) can be proven. Together with the requirement of “effectivity”, this
implies that the proof system must be recursive in the sense of Section 2. That is, there is a mechanical
test which, for any string, tells whether it is a valid proof, where also the answer “no” is given explicitly
instead of just never answering anything. Although this assumption is strictly stronger than recursive
enumerability, proof systems typically satisfy it.
The proof system must also facilitate the simple reasoning steps in the sequel.
Go¨del’s self-referential sentence is ¬∃x : Prf(x,g), where g is its own encoding as a natural number.
Assume first that the proof system proves ¬∃x : Prf(x,g). Then there is a natural number p that is
the encoding of some proof of ¬∃x : Prf(x,g). By the strength assumption above, the proof system
proves Prf(p,g). From it the proof system can conclude ∃x : Prf(x,g). So it proves both ∃x : Prf(x,g)
and its negation, and is thus not consistent. The case remains where the proof system does not prove
¬∃x : Prf(x,g). Then no natural number is the encoding of a proof of ¬∃x : Prf(x,g). By the strength
assumption above, the proof system proves ¬Prf(0,g), ¬Prf(1,g), and so on. If the proof system is
ω-consistent, then it does not prove ∃x : Prf(x,g). So it leaves both ∃x : Prf(x,g) and ¬∃x : Prf(x,g)
without a proof, and is thus incomplete.
Later Rosser found a modification to the proof that allows to replace ω-consistency with con-
sistency [11]. We call his self-referential sentence R. It is ∀x : (Prf(x,r) → ∃y : y ≤ x∧ Prf(y, r¯)),
where r is the encoding of R and r¯ is the encoding of ¬R. If p is the encoding of a proof of R, then
the system proves R, Prf(p,r), and ∃y : y ≤ p∧ Prf(y, r¯). If such an y indeed exists, then the proof
whose encoding is y yields ¬R, so the system proves a contradiction. Otherwise, the system proves
¬Prf(0, r¯)∧¬Prf(1, r¯)∧ ·· ·∧¬Prf(p, r¯), yielding ¬∃y : y≤ p∧Prf(y, r¯), a contradiction again. ω-con-
sistency is not needed, because ¬Prf(0, r¯)∧ ·· ·∧¬Prf(p, r¯) is a finite expression and thus a sentence.
If p is the encoding of a proof of ¬R, then the system proves Prf(p, r¯) and ∃x : (Prf(x,r)∧¬∃y :
y ≤ x∧Prf(y, r¯)), yielding ∃x : Prf(x,r) ∧¬(p ≤ x). Like above, the system proves one or another
contradiction, depending on whether any of 0, 1, . . . , p−1 is the encoding of a proof of R.
In conclusion, if the system is consistent, then it proves neither R nor ¬R, and is thus incomplete.
The above proof of Rosser’s theorem uses the symbol ≤ that is not part of the first-order language
on arithmetic. It can be expressed as mentioned in Section 2. The crucial property is that if c is a natural
number constant, then no other natural numbers than 0, 1, . . . , c have the properties that x ≤ c and
¬(c+1≤ x). This can be proven from Peano arithmetic, but in the case of other axiom systems, specific
axioms on ≤ may be needed.
In his original publication [2] Go¨del also sketched a proof of a corollary that is now known as Go¨del’s
second incompleteness theorem. It says that natural number arithmetic does not prove its own consis-
tency, if it indeed is consistent. What is more, no recursive consistent theory that contains natural number
arithmetic proves its own consistency. The significance of this result is the following. Some mathemat-
ical principles are easy to accept, while some others have raised doubts. The questionable principles
would become more acceptable, if, with a proof that only uses easily acceptable principles, they were
proven to not yield contradictions. Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem rules out perhaps not all, but
at least the most obvious approaches to such proofs.
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9 Related Work and Conclusions
We have shown that any recursively enumerable first-order theory of finite character strings with concate-
nation and equality either proves a false sentence or fails to prove a true sentence. From this we derived
a similar result about natural number arithmetic with addition, multiplication, and equality, obtaining the
“either proves a false sentence or fails to prove a true sentence” version of Go¨del’s first incompleteness
theorem.
A halting tester is a Turing machine that reads any Turing machine M together with its input I and
tells whether M halts, if executed on I. In addition to inventing his machines, Alan Turing proved that
there is no halting tester [13]. (The modern version of this proof is very simple.)
Our proof of Go¨del’s theorem is based on encoding each claim of the form “M halts on I” as a
sentence in natural number arithmetic. It is not the first such proof. If each encoded sentence “M halts on
I” or its negation were provable by a system that only proves true sentences, then a halting tester would be
obtained by letting a Turing machine test all finite character strings until it finds a proof of halting or non-
halting. Therefore, the system has an unprovable true sentence. Essentially the same reasoning can be
expressed in another words by pointing out that the set of provable sentences is recursively enumerable,
but the set of true sentences is not recursively enumerable, because the true sentences of the form “M
does not halt on I” cannot be enumerated. So truth and provability do not match. This proof is given in,
e.g., [4, p. 354] (leaving the (A) mentioned below as a doubly starred exercise!) and [7, pp. 288–291],
underlies the proof in [8, p. 134], and is at least hinted at in [6, p. 64].
Two major difficult technicalities in Go¨del’s proof are (A) to show that reasoning or computation
can be encoded as properties of natural numbers (so-called Go¨del numbering), and (B) to give a formula
access to its own number. The proof based on non-existence of halting testers makes (B) trivial. It makes
it necessary to check or believe that, given M and I, a Turing machine can perform the construction in
(A). Fortunately, it is rather obvious.
Because natural number arithmetic has no direct construct for expressing finite sequences of natural
numbers, (A) is surprisingly difficult. To do (A), often the Chinese Remainder Theorem is used. That
brings discussion so far from the main topic that some expositions simply skip the issue. Alternatively,
one may add the exponentiation operator nm to the theory, as was done in [8, p. 135]. In [7], Dexter Kozen
made (A) relatively easy by using a slightly less straighforward representation for halting computations
than we did in Section 5, and treating natural numbers essentially as finite sequences of p-ary digits,
where p is a prime. Numbers that were known to be powers of p, but not known which power, were
used to extract individual digits. Thanks to padding with blanks, the representation of each configuration
during a computation used the same number of digits. As a consequence, there was a number c such that
if y extracts a digit in a configuration, then yc extracts the corresponding digit in the next configuration.
Our proof made (A) and (B) easy by doing them in a formalism that is very amenable to them. The
most advanced number-theoretic property needed in the whole proof is that if a number is a power of
prime p, then all its factors other than 1 are divisible by p. The Chinese Remainder Theorem was not
used and the exponentiation operator was not added to the language. Turing machines were referred to
twice: as the basis of the definition of “recursively enumerable proof system”, and as devices that can
perform a simple syntactic transformation.
It seems obvious that the incompleteness of theories of finite character strings can also be proven
with the approach in [4, 7, 8]. Then one may continue like in Section 7. In this combined approach, the
formula Q(x, y) would not be needed (but the computability of (A) by a Turing machine would).
Neil D. Jones has proven the incompleteness of first-order theories of nested lists with concatena-
tion [5, p. 202]. Also this proof is based on the non-existence of halting testers. The counterpart of (A)
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is trivial, because the formalism supports it directly. Nested lists are a strong formalism that can easily
express natural numbers, so this result is not surprising.
Finite character strings with concatenation may at first sight seem a poor formalism: a data type with
infinitely many distinct values could not be much simpler. On the other hand, all computation reduces
to the manipulation of finite character strings both in theory (Turing machines) and in practice (files are
finite sequences of bytes). So the incompleteness of first-order theories of finite character strings with
concatenation seems too obvious to be a new result. To prove it, it suffices to cite Go¨del and then show
that strings can simulate arithmetic. Such simulations have been studied at least in [1, 9]. However,
neither publication explicitly mentions the incompleteness of strings and, indeed, the author has failed to
find any mention of it in the literature. What is more, in this paper the proof was simplified by simulating
in the opposite direction, that is, by proving the incompleteness of strings directly and then deriving the
incompleteness of arithmetic as a corollary. This idea seems to be new.
Even if it turns out that the approach of this paper is not novel, we hope that the paper helps the
readers understand Go¨del’s famous result.
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